Open source intelligence and privacy dilemmas: Is it time to reassess state accountability?

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Introduction
Providing for safety and security is a core task of the state. The rapid development of technology has, in many ways, affected the dynamics of this responsibility. Intelligence- and security agencies and the police increasingly rely on information technology that facilitates the collection of Open Source Information (OSINF). OSINF forms the basis of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), which is gathered through publicly available sources that are unclassified and include sources ranging from (foreign) newspapers, governmental reports, public data, maps, academic sites to blogs, social networking sites, apps and web-based communities.

With the evolution of the internet, a vast array of information has become retrievable with the click of a mouse. In addition to this accumulation of valuable data, the internet also contains large quantities of personal information, often posted online by people themselves through social networking sites, blogging or apps. Individuals regularly share personal information online, which is stored as digital data in databases or in the cloud. This, in turn, has led to new perceptions about how this personal data may be used for security and safety purposes. In many areas the use of OSINF — e.g. the monitoring of different social networking sites, blogs or apps — is growing significantly. Several research centres and think tanks, both public and private, have been established solely with the aim to study, coordinate or develop new approaches to (the gathering of) OSINF and the acquiring of OSINT. Quoting one of the main themes of the ‘2010 Naked intelligence’ conference; ‘the gathering of knowledge in a see through world’ has become a prominent aspect within the security and intelligence industry.³

New strategies for using OSINF are also designed to anticipate national security threats such as international terrorism. Although the chances are slim that a terrorist will post his or her selected target location online, these measures are helpful in monitoring violent extremist views. In 2012 this was confirmed by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) ‘Jihadism on the Web’ report, in which the internet was labelled as the ‘most important medium for the

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dissemination of these (jihadist) ideologies. Returning to the state’s core task of providing safety and security for its citizens, we argue that gathering Open Source Information is a legitimate tool for security governance. As Ben Hayes stated, ‘(…) security services would be negligent if they didn’t utilize information in the public domain to inform their work.

However, the legitimacy of the growing use of OSINF cannot be derived solely from the pursuit of security or safety concerns. (Side) effects for human rights should also be considered. In this article we therefore discuss challenges associated with the use of OSINF — mainly in relation to the freedom of internet and the rights to privacy and data protection. From a human rights perspective, the gathering of OSINT demands proper checks and balances. This is especially important, when security — and intelligence agencies as well as private companies use and exchange information. In this article, we (re)assess the checks and balances for the use and sharing of open source intelligence by, and between, security — and intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies. Even though laws, regulations and policies in relation to OSINF may recognise the need for checks and balances including the value of the right to privacy, data protection or a fair trial, it is nevertheless important to review whether the gathering of OSINF online requires more (state) accountability. Henceforth, in this article we focus on what dilemmas arise with the collection of open source information by security — and intelligence agencies and to a lesser extent the police. We thus address the following questions: Have state accountability mechanisms been able to keep up with the rapidly increasing practice of open source information gathering and exchange? Are sufficient safeguards provided to protect human rights?

Open source information in context
After the 9/11 attacks the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States recommended a greater role for OSINT within security agencies. The following institutionalization of open source collection has been called ‘one of the most high profile reforms (..) aimed at the preventing of terrorists attacks and avoiding intelligence failures’. Meanwhile it is often stated that ‘ninety percent of intelligence comes from open sources’. The definition of open source information, which is at the base of this form of intelligence, is ambiguous. In this section we review some of the definitions and

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Open source intelligence and privacy dilemmas

developments concerning the use of open sources for national — and public security purposes. Open source information is information that is publicly available. In other words; what is not ‘confidential’ and out there in the (digital) public domain. It is the information that anyone can ‘lawfully obtain by request, purchase, or observation’.9 Examples of open information sources include the media (e.g. radio, television, newspapers, websites, blogs), official (governmental) reports, academic sources (papers, conferences, seminars), commercial data and so called ‘gray literature’ such as working papers, unofficial government documents and surveys.10 In this article we focus on the increased availability of personal open source information on the World Wide Web (‘www’). Not only online news pages but also ‘weblogs’, ‘chat rooms’, ‘social networking sites’ including Facebook, Twitter or Skype and ‘apps’ such as Whatsapp or WeChat, are perceived as potential valuable sources for intelligence - and security services and the police. Here, one can, through information technology find unique information about the lives of millions of (world) citizens.11 Open Source Centre director Doan Naquin once said ‘We’re looking at YouTube, which carries some unique and honest-to-goodness intelligence’.12

To acquire this Open Source Intelligence, OSINF (raw data) in the form of an interview, a photograph, a tweet, etc. is ‘analyzed, edited, filtered and validated’. Furthermore, the data is linked with different media sources (e.g. the internet, academic journals, official reports, newspapers, radio and television), in order to verify, complement and contextualize the collected information.13 As is described above, an advantage of this data is that it has become widely available nowadays. Especially with the ‘information explosion’, which is the result of the rapid development of the internet, obtaining OSINF has become significantly cheaper. Simultaneously, the frequent use of open sources by security — and intelligence and law enforcement agencies has been facilitated by legislation. The Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act, for instance, states that first open sources need to be checked before any other methods can be applied.14 Other countries, though sometimes implicitly, often demand similar approaches to

11 For instance, Facebook had at the end of March 2012, 901 million active users. At the first quarter of 2012 an average of 3.2 billion likes and comments were generated by its users each day. See: Facebook, ‘Key Facts’, 2012. Retrieved 2 July 2012, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22.
information gathering. In addition to the growth of available information, the number of public- and private organizations concerned with OSINF and OSINT have increased substantially. In the United States, the National Open Source Center (NOSC) was opened on 1 November 2005 with the goal to effectively collect available open source information. In Europe EUROSINT Forum was installed in 2007 to exchange knowledge and experiences between different professional OSINF analysts. Moreover, initiatives by universities, including the Open Source Intelligence Exchange at Fairmont State University, USA, or think tanks, such as Rand Cooperation, respond to the constant demand for new knowledge in this area. But not only new public institutes, training courses or expertise were created. In addition, the increased outsourcing of information gathering, data mining and analyzing by private companies has been a major development within the security industry. This also affects intelligence gathering. Various private entities are becoming more involved in national — and personal security. For instance, the privately funded company, the OSINT-Group was founded in 2007 and ‘utilizes in each case the best and most relevant sources to respond to established client needs with sensitive yet unique and important ‘open source intelligence’ rather than just ‘information’. Several other private companies like Stratfor, Infosphere AB and Sandstone AB have gained substantial OSINF-market shares as well. Simultaneously, the rise of websites like Wikileaks or OpenLeaks, which facilitate the mass publication of classified information by whistleblowers further reflect this development.

Open source intelligence dilemmas

The benefits of OSINF are emphasized by security consultants, scientists, the media as well as the intelligence community. OSINF is cheap and more widely available than the traditional public information acquired by clandestine services. Moreover, it also provides extra information which sometimes cannot be gained by other intelligence sources (e.g. human intelligence). In addition, as a result of the wide availability of (local) news coverage throughout the internet, the use of online open sources enables security — and intelligence agencies to be more up-to-date. Simultaneously, online open sources may in times of crisis — e.g. a war — be a more reliable and safe way of acquiring intelligence than by polarized human

15 See for instance: The United Kingdom Intelligence Services Act 1994 or the Australian Intelligence Services Act 2001.
16 Hayes, p. 5 (see note 5 above)
17 S. Chesterman, ‘We can’t Spy… If we can’t Buy!: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing ‘Inherently Governmental Functions’”, in The European Journal of International Law, 2008, no. 5, p. 1057.
19 Hayes, p. 3-5 (see note 5 above)
intelligence. The large scale usage of (online) open sources has created new contexts and perspectives that assist intelligence — and security agencies to better understand the complexity of certain security developments within local or national contexts. It enables intelligence — and security agencies to verify (classified) information with various open media sources and data. Finally, it has been argued that because in comparison to other sources online information is more widely available and less secretive, the use of OSINF for intelligence purposes has lowered the threshold for sharing information between intelligence — and security agencies.21

Apart from information security, the (side) effects of the use of OSINF for security – and safety purposes have received little attention in the literature. In this section we therefore introduce some dilemma’s regarding data collecting, — processing, — mining and — sharing of open source information. Of course there are many other dilemmas in relation to the use of OSINF by security — and intelligence agencies or the police. These include the construction of virtual personal identities by others22 or the facilitation of more social control by the state.23 In this article, however, we focus primarily on the collecting, processing, mining and sharing of open source information retrieved from social networking sites, blogs or apps.

Collection

Whether the wider range of available digital information will be considered a blessing or a curse remains to be seen. As a result of an information overload, the need of intelligence — and security agencies and the police to be more critical about information has become more evident. As Hamilton Bean states ‘the amount of available, and potentially useful, information for analysts to consider (…) (is) increasing to nearly unmanageable levels’.24 The search of intelligence analysts in the information jungle called the internet has become more difficult and requires new skills from open source analysts. This kind of expertise needs to be developed by intelligence — and security agencies and the police.25

A second obstacle is the multiplication of individual sources. This so called ‘echo’ effect occurs when a news-item that appears in one source (e.g. a website) is

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24  Bean, p.7 (see note 7 above)
25  See e.g., H. Minas, ‘Can the open source intelligence emerge as an indispensible discipline for the intelligence community in the 21st century?’, Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010.
spread among a considerable number of other media sources. The risk arises when a story is framed in differing ways by a variety of sources of which many only reflect a certain part of the story, sometimes in different ways. This may mislead OSINF analysts. Consider, for example, a two minute lasting YouTube film of one man hitting another man on a street. A second film of the incident, which for the sake of the argument lasted five minutes, showed that the man, who was hit on the head, had kicked his girlfriend numerous times and subsequently she had begged for help, had not been posted online but was recorded by someone else on a mobile phone. If journalists were to write about this incident, they would probably find the YouTube film and several references on social networking sites and may be tempted to conclude that the first man was at fault. In turn this creates a reality of its own and the echo effect could lead to the first man being labelled as the ‘villain’, whereas in reality the second man carries primary responsibility for the turn of events.

**Personal data: Processing, sharing, mining and storage**

Further dilemmas arise with the collection, processing and storage of intelligence by security — and intelligence agencies and the police. In 2009 the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) invested in a private company that specialized in monitoring social networking sites. Similar developments have been reported about Europol. It is not widely known that information from social networking sites is being gathered and monitored by intelligence - and security agencies and shared among national - and international actors, but there are many incidents that suggest this is the case. For example, when in 2012 two British tourists were detained and deported for tweeting that they were going to ‘destroy America’ during their holiday, it became clear that Twitter accounts were monitored. In the same year Saudi journalist Hamza Kashgaru was deported from Malaysia. With alleged support of Interpol he had been located there after he fled Saudi

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26 Best and Cumming, p.7 (see note 8 above)
31 Not his real name.
Arabia due to an ‘insulting’ tweet about the Prophet Muhammad. A further expansion of this monitoring of social networking sites was indicated by an article in February 2012 that proclaimed the ‘US seeks to mine social media to predict future’. More specifically, the development of new software was discussed which enables security - and intelligence agencies to mine information of social networking sites. In a response, Open Source Centre director Patrick O’Neill stated that ‘we need to see social media as intelligence gathering very similar to spying’.

An important dilemma with the processing of the information that is collected from the social media relates to the storage of large datasets that contain quantities of digital personal information. Subsequently, ‘data analysis tools (are used) to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and relationships’. Data mining tools in relation to collected information from e.g. social networking sites can be used by law enforcement and security — and intelligence agencies to develop risk profiles and label individuals as potential security risks. For most people this profiling takes place without the data subject even knowing that he or she is being profiled. This development has led to significant concerns about privacy and data-protection as well as the right to a fair trial. What if an angry ex-girlfriend posts a Facebook message that her former boyfriend is a ‘hi-tech terrorist’ and he is subsequently barred from entering the USA; Will he ever find out why?

By stating ‘just because data is accessible doesn’t mean that using it is ethical’ Dana Boyd raises one of the major concerns regarding large scale personal data storage. Consider, for example, a youngster who has expressed radical views about animal rights online and is confronted with this information ten years later during a job interview for an administrative position in a toy store. Would it be considered ethical if the employer asked her about it? Points of view may differ about this: What is in ‘the public domain’ has been redefined to ‘accessible and available for any purpose under any circumstance’. According to Boyd we have ‘stripped content out of context, labelled it data, and justified our actions by the fact that we had access to it in the first place’. People who are concerned with privacy and data protection in relation to data mining of open source information are not afraid, at least initially, of the loss of ownership over their — digital — personal data. They are primarily concerned

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36 Cf. Hildebrandt et al., p.24 (see note 23 above); Pouchard et al., p.2 (see note 19 above)


38 Boyd (see note 37 above)
that their data is disconnected from the context in which they intended it to be. To quote Helen Nissenbaum\footnote{H. Nissenbaum, ‘Privacy as Contextual Integrity’, in Washington Law Review, 2004, no. 1, pp. 101-139.}, ‘privacy is about expectations about the environment, and the norms that accompany this environment, in which your information is shared’. When people share information (e.g. about their health), they share it with a certain audience of people (a doctor), within a certain environment (the hospital) where certain norms apply (e.g. doctor-patient confidentiality). Different to this example is the environment of social networking sites, which deceivingly appear to be for a selected audience. In reality sites like these are often fully transparent with many people listing and reproducing your pursuits. We want to upgrade our statuses and ‘like’ certain pictures on Facebook so others can see who we are, but this information is usually only intended for a specific audience. Boyd therefore stresses rightly that ‘Making content publicly accessible is not equal to asking for it to be distributed, aggregated, or otherwise scaled’.\footnote{Boyd (see note 37 above)} The data mining of social networking sites for security and intelligence purposes is therefore a violation of privacy.

In addition, the Council of Europe highlighted the risks of automatic data processing profiling.\footnote{Council of Europe, The Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal data in the Context of Profiling, Recommendation CM/REC(2010)13 and explanatory memorandum, 2010, pp.28-32.} When data for someone is produced based on the data of others, the data subject ‘a priori cannot suspect the existence of correlation processes that might result in certain characteristics of other individuals being attributed to him or her on the basis of a probability calculation’.\footnote{Ibid.} For instance, when a certain person has been detained at an airport and deported because of his alleged violent radical views. Other people who perhaps have updated their Facebook statuses with words that relate to the profile of the deported radical, may subsequently be treated differently by customs and border control or be blacklisted as risk passengers, which, in reality, does not correspond to their actual ‘threat level’. In other words, in addition to its benefits, profiling also dilutes valuable information concerning implicit personal characteristics that may be crucial for detecting potential violent extremist. Stories and lives, which take place outside the realm of social networking sites are not taken into account and this may lead to the profiling of persons who in reality are no threat (false positives) - e.g. the case of the British tourists - or not identifying those who actually pose a threat (false negatives).

Hildebrandt, Koops and De Vries\footnote{Hildebrandt et al., p.8 (see note 23 above)} also focus on the side effects of profiling. They state that the process of identity construction might be affected by profiling based on data mining techniques. Accordingly, profiling may lead to a different treatment that could affect real-life opportunities. When people are

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\cite{Boyd (see note 37 above)}
\cite{Ibid.}
\cite{Hildebrandt et al., p.8 (see note 23 above)}
unaware of being profiled or where their personal data is stored, they may change their behaviour after experiencing the negative consequences of this profiling. This can be considered a privacy violation; at least when privacy is defined as the ‘freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s identity’.44

**Open source accountability**

Open source information has increased the range of security tools at the disposal of security — and intelligence officials or police officers. Nonetheless, the side effects of this new method of intelligence gathering should be balanced by a form of accountability, which is sufficient both in theory and in practice. To illustrate, in most Western societies there is strict legislation for phone — or internet tapping, however for social networking sites or apps this is less evident. Furthermore, many security officials probably do not see the need for more accountability for OSINT. They may argue, for example, that social networking sites are part of the public domain and that therefore anyone is able to access it. Henceforth what is the issue with monitoring by public — or private security analysts? And, why should they keep track of what kind of information they collect? The difference, however, between just anyone and a security official is that OSINT can indirectly or directly affect someone’s private life or future opportunities. As mentioned before, the use of OSINF for intelligence purposes has real life consequences. From a human rights perspective these side effects should be balanced. Henceforth, state accountability for the use of OSINF is reviewed in this section.

As a concept accountability has a normative aspect intertwined with notions of justice, responsibility, integrity, fairness and democracy.45 Simultaneously accountability is concrete and ‘value free’ and focuses on the ‘obligations to evidence management or performance imposed by law, agreement or regulation’.46 Blind distinguishes between ‘accountability as the philosophy of government’ and accountability as the ‘means’ of government.47 In this article we recognize this difference and differentiate between the process through which politicians or heads of security — and intelligence agencies or the police inform society about their plans and actions in terms of open source collection and justify the need to do so, while the actual behaviour of officials and the outcome analyses by security — and intelligence agencies or the police are subject to review or sanctions.48

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47  Blind, p.4 (see note 45 above)
This aforementioned form of accountability is characterised by its focus on the rule of law and good governance, as well as the inclusion of civil society or ordinary people. It could imply that the head of a security — and intelligence agency, or those politically responsible, not only publicly announce the purpose of collection, processing, mining or sharing of OSINF, but also limit its use to predefined threats such as national security (e.g. for cyber espionage, international terrorism). Furthermore, international — and/or national law makers should determine what the boundaries are (the rule of law) and how data subjects can seek readdress (internal — or external accountability mechanisms). Finally, the design of software that enables OSINT and simultaneously emphasizes accountability (data protection by design) should be modified accordingly. This includes privacy-enhancing-technologies (PET’s) or transparency-enhancing-technologies (TET’s). These measures may be considered as a form of good governance in relation to balancing the security officials’ use of OSINT.

Apart from the necessity to protect national security interests, which may interfere with transparency efforts, there are other accountability dilemmas in relation to OSINF. Ensuring accountability is more complex if the information is not collected by the security agency itself, but by other public — or private entities. It is not uncommon for intelligences and security agencies to share information on an (inter-)national level and since 9/11 it has become more common for law enforcement agencies to do so as well. This is a recent development because ‘traditionally a distinction exists between collecting intelligence for national security purposes and gathering evidence for criminal investigations, as they serve different purposes’. Security — and intelligence agencies prefer to keep their sources confidential, whereas law enforcement agencies ultimately have to share the case file with the defence council. Nonetheless, OSINT used by intelligence — and security agencies is also collected and processed by other state agencies and sometimes shared with international partners and this has affected accountability in practise. Consider for instance whether security analysts know what the original source of a piece of information containing personal data was, let alone if those affected may ever have the opportunity to access or correct it. What if the personal data is used by the security analyst’s agency for a security clearance investigation of refugees?

Likewise OSINF and OSINT are also collected by private companies. As is discussed above, there has been a major growth in private companies involved in the collection of OSINF and the acquiring of OSINT. The Wikileaks Global

49 Blind (see note 45 above); Ackerman (see note 46 above)
Intelligence Files, for example, reflect how the company Stratfor provides intelligence to public and private entities including the US Defense Intelligence Agency.\(^{52}\) One of the released 5.5 million hacked Stratfor emails reveals the existence, a predictive software system TrapWire of TrapWire Inc. that combines CCTV images and number plate recognition (ANPR) collected in the public domain of two America cities.\(^{53}\) Another multinational security company Raytheon has developed a riot program that mines social networking sites and on the basis of the outcome is able to track people at their location.\(^{54}\) Evidently, private entities are able to sell or share the software or the open source information with security — and intelligence agencies or the police, who probably use it for investigation purposes.\(^{55}\) These developments take place, while questions of accountability for the use of the personal data stored on social networking sites remain unaddressed. As Ben Hayes concludes ‘we must (then) develop the tools and communities needed to bring them under democratic control’.\(^{56}\)

In response to these developments, civil society is in the best position to hold the state accountable. Regarding the use of open social networking one of the challenges in terms of holding security officials or their agencies accountable is that in most cases the data subject has no idea that their online behaviour has been monitored. When this monitoring leads to differential treatment accountability issues become more realistic. But who will issue a complaint? Consider if you are not aware that your ‘denial of an opportunity’ is the result of a private company or an intelligence agency keeping track of your digital pursuits? To some extent civil society can hold security agencies accountable by blogging, writing reports, informing the public or petitioning to public authorities. Nonetheless, OSINT is a growing business and challenging to monitor for outsiders. Subsequently, some take more drastic steps such as hacking (governmental) websites or developing encryption software programs to communicate ‘without anyone watching’.

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\(^{56}\) Hayes, p.8 (see note 5 above)
Reflections

In this article we argue that the increased use of Open Source Information (OSINF) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for safety and security purpose needs to be balanced by assessing what state accountability in a digital world should entail. Even though security — and intelligence agencies and the police are tempted to increase their use of social networking sites, tweets, blogs or apps, state accountability mechanisms have struggled to adapt to the online open source culture. Consider for instance the dilemma that intelligence is frequently collected, processed, minded and stored by external entities including foreign security — and intelligence agencies or private companies. Subsequently, it is reasonable to assume that the security officials or analysts, who are the end-users, are oblivious to the original source or its specific context. The use of OSINT requires, despite the fact that ordinary people are usually unaware of being profiled or where or how their digital personal data is stored in data bases or ‘the cloud’, that the public at large begins to ask more questions. The most important reason being that despite the safety and security benefits, this information may have real-life consequences.

State accountability for OSINT should at least require that it is used on the basis of a law. Furthermore politicians, heads of security agencies or security officials should proactively inform society about their plans and actions in relation to OSINF and justify the need to acquire OSINT. This should preferably happen online and also, if possible, at the — public — entity where the data subjects are confronted with the outcome. Even though the security official, who collects information about a person who potentially poses a threat, may be aware that this particular information needs to be verified, it is reasonable to assume that in real life no risks are taken.

Furthermore, state accountability should entail that the actual process and outcome of data collection, — processing, — mining and — sharing is subjected to review or sanctions. In practice, however, this is challenging: Which entity or who carries the responsibility? And, what about accountability? On an individual level: Is it the analyst, the risk profiler, the executive security official etc.? Is individual accountability in this context realistic or is it simply a matter that when everybody, the whole chain of security officials who collect, mind, process and store data, is responsible, nobody is accountable? Formally those entities who collect and store OSINT are accountable, but in practice it is unlikely that a data subject will ever have access or correct information (probably for security reasons). Therefore before any form of new state accountability mechanism is considered, an informed public — and political debate about the desirability of OSINF accountability by the state should take place. The use of OSINT for safety and security purposes is a reality, but (re)assessing state accountability is necessary for its legitimate use by security — and intelligence agencies and the police.